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OFFICERS UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
John T. Plecnik* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The year is 1957 and you are Ronald Dworkin,1 law clerk to Judge 
Learned Hand of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Both 
you and Judge Hand spend the majority of your time performing legal 
research and writing court opinions—an important task by any measure. 
However, from that point on, the natures of your respective positions 
diverge. Judge Hand was appointed by President Calvin Coolidge and 
confirmed by the Senate. You were hired by the Judge after a brief 
interview in between classes at Harvard Law. Judge Hand renders final 
appellate court decisions on life and death issues. Any decision you author, 
however insignificant, is subject to the Judge’s supervision and approval. 
Although a law clerk does the work of a judge, a law clerk is not a judge. 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising to learn that an Article III judge is an 
Officer of the United States, who must be selected pursuant to the special 
procedures of the Appointments Clause, whereas a law clerk is a mere 
employee, who may be hired by anyone in any manner. Even absent a legal 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. 
B.A., Belmont Abbey College, 2003; J.D., Duke University School of Law, 2006; LL.M. in Taxation, 
New York University School of Law, 2009. I thank the participants of the 2013 Pittsburgh Tax 
Workshop, including Judge Mark Holmes of the U.S. Tax Court, Danshera Cords, Charlotte Crane, 
Michelle Drumbl, Heather Field, William Foster, Andy Grewal, David Herzig, Kristin Hickman, Steve 
Johnson, Leandra Lederman, Shannon McCormack, and Shu-Yi Oei. In particular, I thank the 
Workshop’s organizer, Mirit Eyal-Cohen. I am also grateful to my colleagues David Forte, Browne 
Lewis, and James Wilson for helpful discussions on the subject matter of this Article. Lastly, I thank the 
editors of the Pittsburgh Tax Review, especially Saheli Chakrabarty. Any errors in this Article are my 
own, and the conclusions do not necessarily represent the views of any other individual. 
1 Judge Learned Hand famously referred to Professor Ronald Dworkin “as the best law clerk he 
ever had.” In Memoriam, Ronald Dworkin, NYU LAW (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ 
RONALD_DWORKIN_MEMORIAM. Throughout his distinguished career, Professor Dworkin taught 
at Yale, Oxford, and NYU, and was one of the most cited legal scholars of the twentieth century. Fred 
R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. S1 (2000). Professor Dworkin passed 
away on February 14, 2013. 
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standard, the answer is almost intuitive in this stark case. However, the 
dividing line between an Officer and employee is not always so clear. 
After clerking, you join Sullivan & Cromwell in New York to pay off 
your student loans and make the down payment on your first home. 
Thereafter, you enter the professoriate at Yale Law and start writing 
lengthy symposium pieces on political philosophy. In the years that follow, 
three of your former colleagues at Sullivan also leave Big Law, but decide 
on government service instead. One successfully applies to the U.S. Tax 
Court to serve as a special trial judge.2 Another sits for the ALJ exam and 
is selected as an administrative law judge by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation.3 A third joins the Internal Revenue Service as an appeals 
officer.4 Each one of these positions serves an adjudicative function and is 
imbued with a degree of authority. However, none of them are entirely free 
from supervision by higher-ranking judges or officials. Your friends’ 
authority falls somewhere in the gray area between an Article III judge and 
a law clerk—between what clearly constitutes an Officer versus a mere 
employee. In these closer cases, intuition alone is not enough to draw the 
line. A precise definition of what constitutes an Officer is necessary to make 
the finer distinctions. 
Much ink has been spilled, and many keyboards worn, debating the 
definition of “Officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause 
of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Most recently, 
this debate has focused on the denizens of the Office of Appeals of the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In Tucker I, the U.S. Tax Court faced the 
                                                                                                                           
 
2 The chief judge of the U.S. Tax Court has the authority to appoint special trial judges. I.R.C. 
§ 7443A(a). 
3 To qualify for selection as an administrative law judge for any federal agency, an applicant must 
be licensed to practice law, possess seven years of trial or hearing experience, and pass the 
“administrative law judge competitive examination” administered by the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management. Classification Qualifications, US OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, http://www 
.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qualifications/general-schedule-qualification-standards/ 
specialty-areas/administrative-law-judge-positions/. This examination is best known as the ALJ exam. 
4 The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service hires appeals officers and all personnel 
within the Office of Appeals pursuant to her general hiring authority. I.R.C. § 7804(a) (“Unless 
otherwise prescribed by the Secretary, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to employ 
such number of persons as the Commissioner deems proper for the administration and enforcement of 
the internal revenue laws . . . .”); see also Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 135 (2010) (“the Office of 
Appeals exists pursuant to section 7804(a)”). 
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question of whether the settlement officers, appeals officers, and appeals 
team managers (collectively, IRS hearing officers) within the Office of 
Appeals are Officers or mere employees.5 In Tucker II, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) faced the same 
question on appeal.6 Both courts sided with the IRS in holding that none of 
the above are Officers. Although it hardly seems controversial to agree with 
the Tax Court and D.C. Circuit when the U.S. Supreme Court denies 
certiorari in the case,7 remarkably, all previous scholarship disputes the 
outcome of the Tucker decisions.8 This Article will defend that outcome as 
a proper application of Supreme Court precedent. 
The distinction between Officers and employees is constitutionally and 
practically significant, because the former must be appointed by the 
President, with or without the advice and consent of the Senate, Courts of 
Law, or Heads of Departments.9 In contrast, employees may be hired by 
any arm of government. For obvious reasons, only a small minority of 
government officials are appointed. The vast majority are hired as 
employees. As in the Tucker decisions, Appointments Clause controversies 
are generally triggered when a government official who was hired as an 
employee is accused of unconstitutionally wielding the more significant 
authority of an Officer. If the accusation is proved, then the government 
official was acting ultra vires and every decision the official made is 
presumptively invalid and subject to collateral attack.10 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114 (2010). 
6 Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 646 (2012). 
7 Tucker v. Comm’r, 133 S. Ct. 646 (U.S. 2012). In addition, the Tax Court and D.C. Circuit 
recently reaffirmed the Tucker decisions. See Byers v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1168 (2012) (citing 
Tucker with approval), aff’d, Byers v. Comm’r, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 933 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2014). 
8 See, e.g., Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying Which Government 
Workers Are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L. REV. 1143 (2011); Carlton M. 
Smith, Does Collection Due Process Violate the Appointments Clause?, 126 TAX NOTES 777 (2010); 
Carlton M. Smith, Does the Failure to Appoint Collection Due Process Hearing Officers Violate the 
Constitution’s Appointments Clause?, 10 J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 35, 42 (2008). 
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
10 See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 879 (1991) (noting that the Appointments Clause 
“challenge goes to the validity of the Tax Court proceeding”). 
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The entire text of the Appointments Clause is brief, leaving case law to 
fill in the blanks. To date, virtually every court and commentator begins 
their analysis by conceding that the case law, and hence, the doctrine of the 
Appointments Clause is unclear. Unfortunately, this lack of clarity has 
resulted in a sort of constitutional Rorschach test for who is an Officer, 
giving some comfort to both sides in nearly every case. The usual mode for 
deciding an Appointments Clause case was comparative—courts would 
analogize the position at issue to similar positions in other cases.11 No 
more. This Article submits that subsequent to the seminal Tucker decisions, 
the black letter law for distinguishing between Officer and employee is 
close to fully developed. 
This Article is the first to comprehensively outline the post-Tucker 
doctrine of the Appointments Clause. Consequently, it is the first to state 
the post-Tucker definition of Officer. Under Tucker I, an Officer under the 
Appointments Clause holds a position that is (1) “established by Law,” 
(2) “continuing,” and (3) vested with “significant authority.”12 Under 
Tucker II, “significant authority” consists of (1) power over “significant” or 
important matters, (2) “discretion,” and (3) “final” decision-making 
authority.13  
Looking back to the opening hypothetical, we intuit that a law clerk is 
a lesser functionary or mere employee,14 and from case law, we know the 
status of special trial judges,15 administrative law judges (ALJs) of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),16 and IRS appeals 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 162 (“The Supreme Court has yet to fully define the term ‘significant 
authority’; and ‘ascertaining the test’s real meaning requires a look at the roles of the employees whose 
status was at issue in other cases.’”) (quoting Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
12 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 152–65. 
13 Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
14 Under this Article’s interpretation of the Tucker tests, a law clerk is demonstrably not an 
Officer. A law clerk’s position is (1) “established by Law,” because it is lawful; and (2) “continuing,” 
because it is full-time and indefinite; but lacks (3) “significant authority.” Although the position has 
(1) power over “significant” or important matters, it lacks (2) discretion and (3) final decision-making 
authority, because a judge supervises and approves all of a law clerk’s work. 
15 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 (“We agree with the Tax Court and the Second Circuit that a special 
trial judge is an ‘inferior Officer’ whose appointment must conform to the Appointments Clause.”). 
16 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134 (“As the ALJs . . . have no [final decision-making authority], we 
conclude that they are not inferior officers.”). 
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officers.17 In Freytag v. Commissioner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
special trial judges are Officers,18 whereas the D.C. Circuit held that FDIC 
ALJs and IRS appeals officers are mere employees in Landry v. FDIC19 and 
Tucker II,20 respectively. The more interesting question is why. This Article 
submits that the Tucker decisions answer this question with their tripartite 
tests for Officer and “significant authority.” In fact, this Article posits that 
the outcome of every modern Appointments Clause case, dating back to 
Buckley v. Valeo,21 is explicable through this doctrine. 
In Part II, this Article will describe the meaning and purpose of the 
Appointments Clause. In Part III, this Article will briefly outline the early 
precedent and the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo.22 Lastly, Part IV 
explains the Tucker decisions23 in light of the Constitution, previous 
precedent, and status quo bias. It also delineates the current definition of 
Officer. 
II. MEANING AND PURPOSE OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
A. Meaning of the Appointments Clause 
The text of the Appointments Clause is set forth in Article II, Section 
2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution and provides for the appointment of 
“Officers of the United States”: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges 
of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 165 (“Since [FDIC ALJs are not Officers] the lesser position of CDP 
‘appeals officer’ [is not an Officer]”); Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1135 (“we find even Appeals employees’ 
authority over tax liability insufficient to rank them as inferior Officers”). 
18 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881. 
19 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134. 
20 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1135. 
21 See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1151 
(“Current Appointments Clause discussions generally date back only to 1976.”). 
22 Buckley, 424 U.S. 1. 
23 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 165; Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1135. 
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Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.24 
This text—coupled with other provisions in the Constitution as well as 
Supreme Court precedent—allows us to draw three uncontroversial 
conclusions as to its meaning. 
1. Four Modes of Selection under the Appointments Clause 
The Appointments Clause requires all “Officers” to be appointed by 
one of four modes: (1) by the President with Senate confirmation, (2) by the 
President alone, (3) by the Courts of Law, and (4) by the Heads of 
Departments.25 Although the first two modes require little or no 
explanation, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has held that the 
term “Courts of Law” is not limited to Article III courts and includes 
Article I legislative courts such as the U.S. Tax Court.26 It should also be 
noted that a Department is defined as a “‘free-standing, self-contained 
entity in the Executive Branch,’” such as the Department of the Treasury.27 
It refers to “executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments . . . .”28 
“Accordingly, the term ‘Heads of Departments’ does not embrace ‘inferior 
commissioners and bureau officers’” who head up sub-departments and 
agencies within Departments such as the IRS.29 Therefore, the Secretary of 
the Treasury is a Department Head who may constitutionally appoint 
“inferior Officers” with statutory permission, whereas the Commissioner of 
the IRS is not. 
                                                                                                                           
 
24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
25 Id. 
26 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 888–92 (“an Article I court, which exercises judicial power, can be a 
‘Court of Law’ within the meaning of the Appointments Clause”). 
27 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (quoting 
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 915 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
28 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886. 
29 Id. (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878)). The IRS is an agency within 
the Treasury Department. Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“the IRS, a subordinate 
agency within the Treasury Department”). 
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2. Officer v. Employee 
The Appointments Clause distinguishes between Officers, who must 
be appointed, and mere employees, who may be hired by anyone in any 
manner. This is an implicit distinction, because the Appointments Clause 
never utilizes the term “employee,” let alone juxtaposes that term against an 
Officer. However, the Supreme Court has held that the term Officer “does 
not include all employees of the United States . . . .”30 Furthermore, it has 
defined the term “employee” to mean “lesser functionaries subordinate to 
officers of the United States.”31 
Lastly, the Tax Court has recently held that “the Appointments Clause 
governs appointment of individual persons,” not groups.32 The appropriate 
inquiry is whether a single position possesses the necessary characteristics 
of an Office, not whether several positions might collectively constitute an 
Office.33 
3. Principal v. Inferior Officer 
The Appointments Clause distinguishes between “principal 
Officers,”34 who must be appointed by the President with Senate 
confirmation, and “inferior Officers,” who may be appointed by the 
President alone, Courts of Law, or Heads of Departments if Congress 
permits by statute.35 Without statutory permission, “inferior Officers” must 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 (citing Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); Germaine, 
99 U.S. at 511). 
31 Id. 
32 Byers v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1168 (2012) (“the Appointments Clause governs 
appointment of individual persons as ‘officers of the United States.’ It does not apply to a group of 
individuals who collectively constitute an office.”) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126; Germaine, 99 U.S. 
at 510). 
33 Id. 
34 “The term ‘principal officer’ is not in the Appointments Clause but is borrowed from the 
immediately preceding clause (i.e., U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1), which provides that ‘The President 
* * * may require the Opinion in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, 
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.’” Tucker, 135 T.C. at 122. 
35 In the so-called “Excepting Clause,” the Appointments Clause provides that “the Congress may 
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in 
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. . . . [I]ts obvious purpose is administrative 
convenience . . . .” Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997) (citing Germaine, 99 U.S. at 
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be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation just like “principal 
Officers.”36 
“The line between ‘inferior’ and ‘principal’ officers is one that is far 
from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be 
drawn.”37 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the distinction 
between inferior and principal Officers is not so much about their rank or 
responsibility, but whether the Officer in question has a superior.38 An 
Officer who answers directly to the President is a “principal Officer,” 
whereas an Officer who answers to yet another Officer is an “inferior 
Officer.”39 One significant factor in determining whether one Officer is 
answerable to another is whether that Officer may be removed by the other 
at will and without cause.40 
B. Purpose of the Appointments Clause 
“[T]he Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of 
‘etiquette or protocol’; it is among the significant structural safeguards of 
the constitutional scheme.”41 Specifically, the Founders authored the 
Appointments Clause as a safeguard for the separation of powers.42 To that 
end, “[t]he Appointments Clause has four related but distinct purposes.”43 
                                                                                                                           
 
510). However, “that convenience was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumbersome 
procedure [of appointment by the President with Senate confirmation] only with respect to the 
appointment of ‘inferior Officers.’” Id. 
36 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Tucker, 135 T.C. at 125–26 (“while the Appointments Clause 
does allow an exception for inferior officers to be appointed by the President alone or by the Secretary, 
the terms of that exception are that ‘Congress may by Law vest the Appointment’ in the President alone 
or the Head of a Department. Where Congress has not made any such exception ‘by Law,’ then the 
default rule applies.”). 
37 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162 (“In particular, we noted that ‘[t]he power to remove 
officers’ at will and without cause ‘is a powerful tool for control’ of an inferior.” (quoting Edmond, 520 
U.S. at 665)). 
41 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659. 
42 The Supreme Court has stated “that we must examine the language of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2” in the 
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1. Prevent One Branch From Creating and Filling the Same Office 
First and foremost, the Appointments Clause was intended to guard 
against one branch of government both creating and filling the same 
government office.44 This concern arose in direct response to the colonial 
practice of King George III, who “erected a multitude of New Offices, and 
sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people and eat out their 
substance.”45 At the time, this practice of creating and filling the same 
government office was considered “the most insidious and powerful 
weapon of eighteenth century despotism.”46 Under the Appointments 
Clause, no one branch of government is king.47 Generally, the legislative 
branch creates the position of Officer, and the executive or judicial branch 
must fill it.48 
2. Prevent Diffusion of the Appointment Power 
The Appointments Clause guards against “the diffusion of the 
appointment power” in the executive branch by prohibiting Congress from 
granting that power to lower-level officials.49 Only the President, or one 
appointed by the President, may appoint an “Officer.”50 Stated otherwise, 
the Appointments Clause allows “only one degree of separation between 
any duly appointed officer and the President, thus maintaining the locus of 
executive power in the President himself.”51 
                                                                                                                           
 
roots of the separation-of-powers concept embedded in the Appointments Clause are structural and 
political.” Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878. 
43 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 120. 
44 Id. 
45 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776). 
46 GEORGE S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 143 (1969). 
47 See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 120. 
48 See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659 (“By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the 
principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional 
encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches.”). 
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3. Political Accountability 
By preventing “diffusion,” the Founders also endeavored to ensure 
political accountability.52 By guaranteeing only one degree of separation 
between the President and her Officers, the President cannot avoid 
responsibility for the actions of her Officers.53 As Alexander Hamilton 
noted, “The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly 
and absolutely.”54 In addition, as James Madison noted, by maintaining a 
proximity between the President and her Officers, even unelected 
appointees are “the choice, though a remote choice, of the people 
themselves.”55 
4. More Qualified Officers 
By vesting the bulk of the appointment power in the President rather 
than Congress, the Founders hoped to “assure a higher quality of 
appointments.”56 Specifically, they hoped “that the President would be less 
vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal favoritism than would a 
collective body. ‘The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will 
naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard to 
reputation.’”57 
III. APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The law of the Appointments Clause derives first from Article II, 
Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and second from a long line of 
Supreme Court precedent that authoritatively interprets the Clause. 
However, in recent years, an opinion authored by the Office of Legal 
Counsel of the Department of Justice (the “OLC”) has been cited with 
increasing frequency by scholars and the federal courts, including the 
                                                                                                                           
 
52 Id. at 121. 
53 Id. 
54 THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton). 
55 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
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Supreme Court.58 The OLC is a core of government attorneys and describes 
itself as “outside counsel for the other agencies of the Executive Branch.”59 
Although opinions authored by the OLC are not binding precedent like a 
court opinion, they are extremely persuasive as the expert position of the 
government agency tasked with “providing legal advice to the Executive 
Branch on all constitutional questions.”60 
The opinion at issue is entitled “Officers of the United States within 
the Meaning of the Appointments Clause.” In line with the Supreme 
Court’s choice of parlance, this Article will hereinafter refer to this opinion 
as the “OLC Memo.”61 The OLC Memo reads like a treatise and gives a 
comprehensive outline of Appointments Clause jurisprudence from the 
nation’s founding through its publication date on April 16, 2007. Although 
the courts have disagreed with the OLC Memo in several significant 
respects,62 it is impossible to objectively discuss recent case law without 
acknowledging its influence. 
A. Definition of Officer Under Early Case Law 
In several of the earliest cases, the courts used “circular logic” to 
define the constitutional term of Officer.63 Namely, if a position was filled 
pursuant to the Appointments Clause, then the courts held that the position 
is an Office and must be appointed.64 If a position is not appointed, then 
                                                                                                                           
 
58 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3178. 
59 THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, http://www 
.justice.gov/olc/. 
60 Id. 
61 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3178. 
62 Most significantly, the OLC Memo claims that “discretion” is merely an “[a]rguably [r]elevant 
[c]haracteristic[]” and not “necessary” for significant authority. Memorandum Opinion for the General 
Counsels of the Executive Branch, 31 Op. O.L.C. 1, 17 (2007). This directly contrasts with Tucker II, in 
which the D.C. Circuit held that “the lack of discretion is determinative. . . .” Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134. 
63 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1132–33 (“[T]he earliest Appointments Clause cases often employed 
circular logic, granting officer status to an official based in part upon his appointment by the head of a 
department.”). 
64 See, e.g., United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307 (1888) (“Unless a person in the service of 
the Government, therefore holds his place by virtue of an appointment by the President, or of one of the 
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conveniently enough, the position is not an Office.65 However, even in the 
primordial days of the nation’s founding, there was a rough consensus that 
a position is an Office if its holder is “delegated sovereign authority.”66 
English common law and colonial era law dictionaries agreed that any 
person “charged” or “delegated” the sovereign authority of the government 
to intervene in others’ affairs without their consent is an Officer.67 The OLC 
Memo posits that this early conception of sovereign authority is the 
forerunner of “significant authority” in Buckley v. Valeo.68 
B. Buckley v. Valeo and Modern Appointments Clause Jurisprudence 
Modern Appointments Clause jurisprudence dates back to Buckley v. 
Valeo,69 wherein the Supreme Court held that a position vested with 
“significant authority” constitutes an Office: 
We think that the term “Officers of the United States” as used in Art. II, defined 
to include “all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government” 
in United States v. Germaine, supra, is a term intended to have substantive 
meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant 
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an “Officer of the United 
States,” and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, 
of that Article.70 
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court reviewed the appointment and 
powers of the eight-member Federal Election Commission (FEC)71 
                                                                                                                           
 
courts of justice or heads of Departments authorized by law to make such an appointment, he is not, 
strictly speaking, an officer of the United States.”). 
65 Id. 
66 Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsels of the Executive Branch, 31 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8 
(2007). 
67 Id. (citing King v. Burnell, (1700) 90 Eng. Rep. 478 (K.B.)); GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1772); T. CUNNINGHAM, 2 A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 
1771); MATTHEW BACON, 3 A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW (4th ed. 1778). 
68 Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsels of the Executive Branch, 31 Op. O.L.C. 1, 11–
12 (2007). 
69 See, e.g., Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1151. 
70 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125–26. 
71 Id. at 137–41. 
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established under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197172 and the 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.73 The Secretary of 
the U.S. Senate and the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives were to 
serve as nonvoting, ex-officio members.74 The other six appointees were 
full voting members, two of which were appointed by the President, two by 
the President pro tempore of the Senate, and two by the Speaker of the 
House.75 The appointments of all six voting members were subject to 
confirmation by both the Senate and House.76 Since none of the voting 
members were selected pursuant to the Appointments Clause, the Supreme 
Court held that none of them may constitutionally exercise significant 
authority.77 
The Supreme Court then reviewed the powers of the voting members 
and sorted them into three categories: (1) investigative and informative 
powers—“functions relating to the flow of necessary information—receipt, 
dissemination, and investigation”; (2) interpretive and rulemaking 
powers—“functions with respect to the Commission’s task of fleshing out 
the statute—rulemaking and advisory opinions”; and (3) enforcement 
powers—“functions necessary to ensure compliance with the statute and 
rules—informal procedures, administrative determinations and hearings, 
and civil suits.”78 The Supreme Court held “there can be no question that” 
Congress could delegate the “investigative and informative” powers to the 
unappointed voting members, because it could delegate those same powers 
to its own committees.79 However, it reached a different conclusion in 
                                                                                                                           
 
72 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3. 
73 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. 
74 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Even the two voting members appointed by the President were not selected pursuant to the 
Appointments Clause because their appointment was subject to confirmation by both the Senate and 
House. Under the Clause, Presidential appointments must be made by the President alone or by the 
President with confirmation by the Senate alone, not by the Senate and the House. See U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 2, cl. 2. 
78 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137. 
79 Id. 
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considering “the more substantial powers” of the voting members.80 The 
Supreme Court held that only an Officer could exercise the interpretive and 
rulemaking powers because they were exercised “free from day to day 
supervision,” and thus, constituted “a significant governmental duty 
exercised pursuant to a public law.”81 The Supreme Court also held that 
only an Officer could exercise the enforcement powers because they 
belonged to the executive branch.82 
In short, we can distill the following legal principles from Buckley v. 
Valeo. First, Buckley coined the term “significant authority” and established 
the principle that only Officers may constitutionally wield such authority.83 
Second, purely investigative and informative powers do not constitute 
significant authority.84 Third, “significant” interpretive and rulemaking 
powers, such as the power to issue regulations or make determinations 
without supervision, or “significant” enforcement powers, such as the 
power to bring suit to enforce a federal statute, constitute “significant 
authority.”85 Fourth, one factor in determining whether authority is 
“significant” in nature is whether such authority is exercised “free from 
day-to-day supervision.”86 This last principle was reaffirmed by Freytag, in 
which the Supreme Court cited to the “independent authority” of special 
trial judges to make final decisions in holding them to be Officers.87 
                                                                                                                           
 
80 Id. at 138. 
81 Id. at 140–41. 
82 Id. at 138–39. 
83 Id. at 125–26. 
84 Id. at 137. 
85 Id. at 138–41. 
86 Id. at 140. 
87 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882. 
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C. The “Duffy Defect” 
The so-called “Duffy Defect” is named for Professor John F. Duffy88 
and refers to Appointments Clause violations.89 Although the Appointments 
Clause is as old as the Constitution itself, Professor Duffy’s work sparked a 
renewed interest in the Clause. In particular, his famous assertion that 
administrative patent judges are Officers not only changed the manner in 
which those judges are appointed, but sparked a flurry of articles and 
lawsuits with respect to other positions. As a result, scholars and 
commentators often refer to an Appointments Clause or “triple 2” violation 
as the “Duffy Defect.” 
To use the popular term in a sentence, the failure to properly appoint 
an Officer in accordance with the special procedures of the Appointments 
Clause is a “Duffy Defect” in that appointment. As the Supreme Court 
concluded in Buckley v. Valeo, only properly appointed Officers may 
constitutionally wield “significant authority.”90 The decisions of a 
defectively appointed Officer are presumptively invalid and subject to 
collateral attack. As a result, the discovery of a potential “Duffy Defect” 
has significant and practical consequences. 
The term “Duffy Defect” was coined shortly after Professor Duffy 
published a brief article on July 23, 2007,91 on the appointment of 
administrative patent judges for the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences under the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus 
Reform Act of 1999.92 Prior to the 1999 Act, those judges were appointed 
by the Secretary of Commerce, who is unquestionably a Department Head 
                                                                                                                           
 
88 Professor Duffy taught at the George Washington University Law School at the time he 
published his blog and law review articles entitled “Are Administrative Patent Judges 
Unconstitutional?” As of the date of this article, he teaches at the University of Virginia School of Law. 
89 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
90 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138–39 (explaining that only Officers may wield significant authority). 
91 John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 2007 PATENTLY-O 
PATENT L.J. 21 (2007). Professor Duffy later republished this brief article with an “Epilogue” detailing 
the response to his work by Congress and the courts. John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges 
Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904 (2009). 
92 Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 199, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 
113 Stat. 1501. 
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who may constitutionally appoint inferior Officers when authorized by 
statute.93 After the 1999 Act took effect on March 29, 2000, those judges 
were appointed by the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO),94 whose formal title is the “Under Secretary of Commerce for 
Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.”95 Analogizing to the special trial judges in Freytag, 
who were held to be Officers due in large part to their “final decision-
making authority,” Professor Duffy concluded that administrative patent 
judges, who make final decisions for the PTO, are indeed Officers and must 
be properly appointed.96 He also observed that the PTO is a mere agency 
within the Department of Commerce, and so the PTO Director is not a 
Department Head who may properly appoint Officers when authorized by 
statute.97 Therefore, every administrative patent judge who was appointed 
since March 29, 2000 was improperly appointed and acting ultra vires.98 
On August 12, 2008, long before the courts could resolve the argument 
first-raised by Professor Duffy, Congress stepped in to pass legislation that 
re-vested the authority to appoint administrative patent judges in the 
Secretary of Commerce.99 Congress’s quick response, and the retroactive 
nature of the law, is widely and rightly seen as a vindication of Professor 
Duffy’s position. Moreover, the Tucker decisions are arguably an 
outgrowth of the “Duffy Defect.”100 When Professor Carlton Smith101 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 Duffy, supra note 91, at 914. 
94 Id. at 904, 912. 
95 35 U.S.C. § 3(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
96 Duffy, supra note 91, at 906–07. 
97 Id. at 910–11. 
98 Id. at 911–12. 
99 Carlton Smith is a former law clerk to Judge Arthur L. Nims of the U.S. Tax Court and a 
Clinical Associate Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. 
Carlton Smith, CARDOZO.YU.EDU, http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/directory/carlton-smith. 
100 Carlton Smith, Tucker v. Commissioner, Petitioner’s Reply Supplemental Memorandum of 
Law, filed Mar. 23, 2009, at 10 n.13. See also Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1144 (“The impact of Duffy’s 
article reached courtrooms as well, prompting an Appointments Clause challenge in Tucker v. 
Commissioner.”). 
101 Smith, supra note 100, at 10 n.13. 
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decided to take the case of Tucker v. Commissioner as pro bono counsel, he 
was very much aware of the “Duffy Defect” and Professor Duffy’s work in 
the patent context.102 In fact, Professor Smith credited Professor Duffy with 
inspiring his Appointments Clause argument in the tax context.103 
Specifically, he alleged that IRS hearing officers wield “significant 
authority” without appointment by a Department Head.104 
D. Recent Scholarship on Tucker and the Appointments Clause 
Recent scholarship on the constitutional line between Officers and 
employees typically cites back to the “Duffy Defect” as its source and 
inspiration.105 In general, it disagrees with the outcome of the Tucker 
decisions, which hold that IRS hearing officers are mere employees.106 In 
his briefs and concurrent publications, Professor Smith argued that IRS 
hearing officers are Officers under the Appointments Clause because they 
are most analogous to the Tax Court special trial judges who were held to 
be Officers in Freytag. 
Professor Stacey Lindstedt107 authored the most recent law review 
article in this area—after Tucker I was decided but prior to Tucker II.108 
                                                                                                                           
 
102 Id. 
103 Id. (“A New York Times article about the defect in the appointment of the patent and trademark 
judges by a person who was not the Head of a Department was the trigger that got petitioner’s counsel 
thinking about whether CDP hearing officer needed to be appointed.”). 
104 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 117. 
105 Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1144 (“a series of articles followed ‘The Duffy Defect,’ questioning 
the applicability of the Appointments Clause to a range of government actors, from Bankruptcy Judges 
to the Pay Czar”) (citing Harold C. Wegner, The Duffy Defect, IP FRONTLINE IP & TECH. MAG. 
(Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.aspx?id=18519&deptid=4; Tuan Samahon, 
Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 233 
(2008); Michael W. McConnell, The Pay Czar Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at A25; 
Steven D. Schwinn, Do White House Czars Violate the Appointments Clause?, CONSTITUTIONAL L. 
PROF. BLOG (Oct. 7, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2009/10/do-white-house-czars-
violate-the-appointments-clause.html). 
106 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
107 Attorneys and Paralegals, Stacy Lindstedt, http://www.oppenheimer.com/Attorneys/Detail 
.aspx?id=1880 (Stacey Lindstedt is a former law clerk to Judge Mark V. Holmes of the Tax Court and 
Legal Writing Instructor at the University of Minnesota Law School.). 
108 See generally Lindstedt, supra note 8. 
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Therein, she argues that Tucker I was wrongly decided on two counts.109 
Where the Tax Court held that the positions of IRS hearing officers are not 
“established by Law” or vested with “significant authority,” Professor 
Lindstedt concludes the opposite.110 
First, Professor Lindstedt argues that “established by Law” is best read 
as meaning “set forth by some legal authority,” not created by statute or 
even regulation.111 Since the position of IRS hearing officer is lawfully 
created by IRS practice and procedure,112 she concludes it is “established by 
Law.”113 Second, Professor Lindstedt argues that “final decision-making 
authority” is unnecessary for “significant authority,” and that the definition 
of finality as the “last word” in an agency is too narrow.114 Instead, “a better 
test of finality” is “an action which is necessary and sufficient for judicial 
review.”115 Since some decisions of IRS hearing officers trigger judicial 
review, she finds that they possess final decision-making authority, and 
thus, significant authority.116 As a result, Professor Lindstedt concludes that 
IRS hearing officers are indeed Officers under the Appointments Clause.117 
In addition to her technical, legal critique of Tucker I, Professor 
Lindstedt also attacks the decision for undermining the purposes of the 
Appointments Clause—namely, political accountability and separation of 
powers.118 This Article agrees with Professor Lindstedt, and the OLC 
Memo to which she cites, that any lawful Office, including that of IRS 
                                                                                                                           
 
109 Id. at 1177–86. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 1177–78. 
112 “[T]he Office of Appeals personnel who were involved in Mr. Tucker’s case were all hired by 
the Commissioner pursuant to section 7804(a).” Tucker, 135 T.C. at 119. In relevant part, section 7804 
provides that “the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to employ such number of persons as 
the Commissioner deems proper for the administration and enforcement of the internal revenue 
laws. . . .” I.R.C. § 7804(a). 
113 Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1177–84. 
114 Id. at 1178–79. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1183–85. 
117 Id. at 1185. 
118 Id. at 1184–89. 
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hearing officer, is “established by Law.”119 However, this Article 
respectfully disagrees with Professor Lindstedt and Professor Smith on the 
ultimate issue. IRS hearing officers lack significant authority and are not 
Officers. In fact, holding otherwise would undermine the purposes of the 
Appointments Clause. If low-level bureaucrats must be appointed like 
judges, then the scrutiny and standards for all appointments will fall. As a 
result, the outcome of the Tucker decisions is not only legally, but 
normatively correct. 
IV. THE POST-TUCKER DEFINITION OF OFFICER 
This Article is the first scholarly attempt to outline the post-Tucker 
doctrine of the Appointments Clause. As a result, it is the first to state the 
post-Tucker definition of “Officer.” 
A. The Tucker Decisions 
In Tucker I, the Tax Court defines an Officer under the Appointments 
Clause as one who holds a position that is (1) “established by Law,” 
(2) “continuing,” and (3) vested with “significant authority.” In Tucker II, 
the D.C. Circuit identifies three “main criteria” for determining when a 
position is vested with “significant authority”: (1) power over “significant” 
or important matters, (2) “discretion,” and (3) “final” decision-making 
authority. 
No modern cases state that significant authority is possible without 
significance or discretion.120 However, some dicta suggest that final 
decision-making authority is not always necessary for a finding of 
significant authority. Although Tucker II is silent on the question of 
whether each of these “main criteria” are necessary to find “significant 
authority,” whenever a court holds that one of the three “main criteria” is 
                                                                                                                           
 
119 Id. at 1177 (citing Officers of the United States within the Meaning of the Appointments 
Clause, 2007 OLC LEXIS 3 at *120 (2007) [hereinafter Officers of the U.S.]). Dicta from Tucker II also 
suggests that Professor Lindstedt’s formulation of “established by Law” is correct. 
120 Although the OLC Memo concedes that “Buckley is sometimes read to hold that persons who 
[lack discretion] cannot themselves be considered officers,” it nonetheless insists that “‘independent 
discretion’ is not a necessary attribute of delegated sovereign authority.” Officers of the U.S., 2007 OLC 
LEXIS 3* at 53–54. 
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absent, it also holds that “significant authority” is absent. Notwithstanding 
dicta to the contrary,121 or the possibility of an extreme case, this Article 
submits that each of the “main criteria” is a necessary element of significant 
authority in all or most cases. 
1. Tucker I: Clarifying Modern Appointments Clause Jurisprudence in 
Defining an “Officer” 
a. Facts 
As with so many modern Greek tragedies, the tale of Larry Tucker 
begins with student loans and a bad economy.122 Mr. Tucker was a 
paralegal in the mid-1990s.123 He personally witnessed the rise of the 
internet and wanted to ride its proverbial wave, so he enrolled at New York 
University for an advanced degree in information technology.124 
Unfortunately for Mr. Tucker, he graduated in 1999, right when the 
technology bubble burst.125 Unable to find steady work, Mr. Tucker 
transferred $44,700 into an E-Trade account and engaged in volatile day 
trading.126 With no experience in the stock market, Mr. Tucker lost more 
than half of his money, and consumed the remainder for personal 
expenses.127 
Broke and unemployed, Mr. Tucker continued to file his tax returns, 
but failed to pay any of the taxes shown on them.128 On May 22, 2004, the 
IRS sent Mr. Tucker a “Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right 
                                                                                                                           
 
121 In Freytag, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that significant enough “duties and discretion” 
might outweigh a “lack of authority to enter a final decision.” However, the Supreme Court did not 
decide the issue, because it found that special trial judges possess final decision-making authority. 501 
U.S. at 881. 
122 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 117–19; Smith, supra note 8, at 777. 
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to a Hearing” for tax years 2000, 2001, and 2002.129 In response, 
Mr. Tucker requested a collection due process (CDP) hearing, which was 
held as a telephone conference between himself, his counsel, and an IRS 
settlement officer.130 
After some correspondence, Mr. Tucker sent a Form 656, “Offer in 
Compromise” (OIC), to the IRS which proposed to settle approximately 
$39,000 of his liabilities for $36,772 in 116 monthly installments of 
$317.131 The settlement officer rejected the OIC and her decision was 
approved by her appeals team manager, a position tasked with overseeing 
CDP hearings.132 In response, Mr. Tucker filed his petition in U.S. Tax 
Court. The case was remanded to the Office of Appeals for further 
consideration, and once again, Mr. Tucker’s OIC was rejected by a second 
settlement officer.133 That rejection was approved by the same appeals team 
manager.134 The case then returned to the Tax Court, where Mr. Tucker 
argued that (1) the IRS abused its discretion in rejecting his OIC and (2) the 
denizens of the Office of Appeals who presided over his CDP hearing were 
unconstitutionally appointed Officers of the United States.135 
b. Abuse of Discretion 
The Tax Court quickly dispensed with Mr. Tucker’s argument that the 
IRS abused its discretion in rejecting his OIC on two grounds.136 First, the 
IRS was justified in rejecting the OIC because Mr. Tucker wrongfully 
dissipated thousands of dollars through day trading.137 Second, dissipation 
aside, there was a reasonable basis for the settlement officer’s 
                                                                                                                           
 







136 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 157. 
137 Id. 
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determination.138 Of greater interest was the Tax Court’s nearly 90-page 
opinion addressing Mr. Tucker’s constitutional argument that settlement 
officers and appeals officers who hear CDP cases, as well as the appeals 
team managers who supervise them, wield the significant authority of an 
Officer and must be installed pursuant to the Appointments Clause.139 
c. Definition of Officer 
The constitutional question squarely in front of the Tax Court was the 
status of the settlement officers, appeals officers, and appeals team 
managers under the Appointments Clause. To determine if these positions 
are that of Officers or employees, the court drew directly on the text of the 
Appointments Clause and Supreme Court precedent to articulate a three-
part test. Namely, an Officer under the Appointments Clause holds a 
position that is (1) “established by Law,” (2) “continuing,” and (3) vested 
with “significant authority.”140 
In Tucker I, the IRS conceded that the positions at issue were 
“continuing.”141 However, the Tax Court held that the positions were not 
“established by Law” or vested with “significant authority.”142 As a result 
of failing two of the three prongs of the test, the Tax Court held that IRS 
hearing officers are mere employees.143 
                                                                                                                           
 
138 Id. 
139 See generally Tucker, 135 T.C. 114. 
140 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 152–60. 
141 Id. at 160 (“[The IRS] concedes that, if the CDP ‘appeals officer’ is a position ‘established by 
Law,’ then it is a ‘continuing’ position”). 
142 Id. at 165 (“An ‘officer or employee’ of the IRS Office of Appeals who conducts CDP 
hearings has neither a position ‘established by Law’ nor ‘significant authority’ that is characteristic of an 
‘officer of the United States’ for purposes of the Appointments Clause.”). 
143 Id. at 165–66. 
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 i. Established by Law 
A position must be “established by Law” in order to constitute an 
Office.144 This Article submits that any lawful Office is “established by 
Law” irrespective of whether such Office is created by statute or regulation. 
The requirement that an Office is “established by Law” is derived 
directly from the text of the Appointments Clause, which provides that 
Offices “shall be established by Law.”145 Courts and commentators alike 
have debated the meaning of this phrase and at least three schools of 
thought have developed. The most stringent view is that a position is 
“established by Law” if and only if Congress adopts a statute which creates 
the position.146 Another somewhat more forgiving view is that a position is 
also “established by Law” if a valid regulation creates it.147 The most 
expansive viewpoint is that any lawful position, that is, any position “set 
forth by some legal authority,” is “established by Law.”148 This Article 
agrees with the OLC Memo, Professor Lindsedt, and dicta from Tucker II, 
that the third and most expansive viewpoint is correct. No other view is 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the Appointments Clause. 
In Tucker I, the Tax Court applied the first two views to conclude that 
the positions of settlement officer, appeals officer, and appeals team 
manager were neither established by statute, nor by regulation. The only 
                                                                                                                           
 
144 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Tucker, 135 T.C. at 152. 
145 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
146 In Tucker I, the Tax Court first analyzed whether the positions of settlement officers, appeals 
officers, and appeals team managers were established by statute. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 152–56. 
147 Several Courts of Appeals have held that positions established by regulation were Offices, 
implying that an Office established by regulation is indeed “established by Law.” Willy v. Admin. 
Review Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that the members of the Administrative Review 
Board of the U.S. Department of Labor, positions created not by statute but by regulation, are inferior 
Officers); Varnadore v. Sec. of Labor, 141 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); Holtzclaw v. Sec. of 
Labor, 172 F.3d 872 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); Pennsylvania v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 80 F.3d 796, 800 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that members of the Appeals Board of the Department 
of Health and Human Services, positions created not by statute but by regulation, are inferior Officers). 
Moreover, in dissent, Justice Breyer has explicitly stated that the Supreme Court permits an Office to be 
“created either by ‘regulations’ or by ‘statute.’” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
177 L. Ed. 2d 706, 752 (U.S. 2010) (citing Mouat, 124 U.S. at 307–08). 
148 Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1177 (citing OLC Memo at 120). 
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statutory reference to appeals officers is present in sections 6320 and 6330 
of the Internal Revenue Code, which were both introduced into law by the 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.149 The 
position of appeals officer already existed as of 1998, and so the position 
was not created by the 1998 Act. Likewise, no regulation created the 
positions within the Office of Appeals. As a result, the Tax Court held that 
none of the positions at issue were “established by Law.”150 
The Tax Court rejected the notion that any lawful Office is 
“established by Law,” because “it risks reading out of the Constitution the 
phrase ‘established by Law.’”151 However, it recognized the potential for 
abusing a narrower conception of the requirement to skirt the Appointments 
Clause. If only positions created by statute or regulation may be Offices, 
then Congress could simply vest a preexisting position, not so created, with 
additional powers. By way of an extreme example, Congress could vest the 
position of janitor with the powers of judge or attorney general. If that 
cosmically powerful janitor is not an Officer, then Congress would be free 
to provide for her appointment in any way like any other employee. It could 
even violate the separation of powers by appointing that janitor itself. This 
would be tantamount to Congress creating and filling the same position, just 
like King George III unleashing his tax collectors in colonial times.152 In 
this type of case, the Tax Court ceded that “the courts would have to see 
through the subterfuge and enforce the Appointments Clause.”153 
However, the OLC Memo goes further still. It insists that “the rule for 
which sorts of positions have been ‘established by Law’ . . . cannot be 
whether a position was formally and directly created as an ‘office’ by law” 
because “[s]uch a view would conflict with the substantive requirements of 
the Appointments Clause.”154 In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit declined to hold 
                                                                                                                           
 
149 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 
685. 
150 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 157. 
151 Id. at 158. 
152 See supra notes 45, 46 and accompanying text. 
153 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 158. 
154 Officers of the U.S., 2007 OLC LEXIS 3*. 
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whether the position of IRS hearing officers was “established by Law.”155 
However, in dicta, the court cited to the OLC Memo in saying “it would 
seem anomalous if the Appointments Clause were inapplicable to positions 
extant in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and to which Congress assigned 
‘significant authority,’ merely because neither Congress nor the executive 
branch had formally created the positions.”156 Professor Lindsedt similarly 
contends that “[a] more workable definition reads ‘established by Law’ to 
mean . . . set forth by some legal authority.”157 This Article concurs with the 
OLC Memo, D.C. Circuit, and Professor Lindsedt that a narrower 
interpretation of the phrase “established by Law” would allow Congress to 
skirt the Appointments Clause and violate the separation of powers. As 
such, it concurs that any lawful Office is “established by Law.” However, a 
position is most clearly “established by Law” when it is created by 
statute.158 
 ii. Continuing 
A position must be “continuing” in order to constitute an Office. A 
position is “continuing” if it is vested with “tenure, duration, emolument, 
and duties” which are “continuing and permanent, not occasional or 
temporary.”159 “A position is most clearly ‘continuing’ if it is permanently 
assigned sovereign authority that does not expire, inter alia, upon the 
passage of time or the completion of a discrete task.”160 
The requirement that an Office is “continuing” has its roots in the 
Constitution, which “refers to an office as something that one ‘holds’ and 
                                                                                                                           
 
155 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133. 
156 Id. 
157 Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1177. 
158 See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 152–53 (quoting Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133; Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.) 
(“Where ‘the “duties, salary, and means of appointment” for the office were specified by statute,’ that is 
considered ‘a factor that has proved relevant in the [Supreme] Court’s Appointments Clause 
jurisprudence.’”). 
159 Auffmordt, 137 U.S. at 327 (Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511–12 (quoting United States v. Hartwell, 
73 U.S. 385, 393 (1868)). 
160 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 160 (citing Auffmordt, 137 U.S. at 326–28; Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511–12; 
Hartwell, 73 U.S. at 393). 
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‘enjoys’ and in which one ‘continues’ . . . .”161 Early precedent also 
reinforces the understanding that a position must have some duration or 
ongoing duties to constitute an Office.162 As far back as George 
Washington, our Presidents have appointed temporary diplomats without 
nominating them to the Senate.163 “In a striking early illustration, President 
Jefferson appointed Senator Daniel Smith as a commissioner to negotiate 
and execute treaties with the Cherokee Indians, yet Jefferson did not submit 
the nomination to the Senate, and Smith did not vacate his seat in the 
Senate.”164 Given that none of the Founders or their contemporaries 
objected to this early and pervasive practice, it stands to reason that it was 
considered constitutional.165 From a survey of the historical record, the 
OLC Memo concludes that the rationale for appointing temporary 
diplomats without following the procedures of the Appointments Clause 
was that those positions were not “continuing,” and hence, were not 
Offices.166 
In a trio of cases decided after the Civil War, the Supreme Court 
articulated, and twice reiterated verbatim, the current black letter law of the 
“continuing” requirement.167 In United States v. Hartwell, the first case of 
                                                                                                                           
 
161 Officers of the U.S., 2007 OLC LEXIS 3* at *74–75. 
162 Id. at *77–78. 
163 Id. at *79. 
164 Id. at *23 (citing 1 Am. St. Papers, Indian Affairs 697–98 (1805)). As noted above, absent 
specific statutory authorization, the President alone may not appoint even inferior Officers without 
confirmation by the Senate. In addition, Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution, otherwise 
known as the Incompatibility Clause, provides that “no Person holding any Office under the United 
States shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” In layman’s terms, 
Congressmen and Senators must resign their position to become Officers. The fact that President 
Jefferson appointed Senator Smith as a commissioner without Senate confirmation, and the fact that the 
Senator did not resign his seat, both strongly suggest that the position of commissioner was not an 
Office. This suggestion is reinforced by the fact that President Jefferson was a founding father and that 
no contemporaneous objections to Senator Smith’s appointment are on record. 
165 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 126 (“Of course, the earliest Congresses and executive administrations 
were not infallible in their adherence to the Constitution, and their example cannot be followed 
uncritically; but we do properly note ‘the early practice of Congress.’”), quoting Free Enter. Fund, 177 
L. Ed. 2d at 734. 
166 For a comprehensive history of the “continuing requirement,” see Officers of the U.S., 2007 
OLC LEXIS 3*. 
167 Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385; Germaine, 99 U.S. 508; Auffmordt, 137 U.S. 310. 
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the trilogy, the Supreme Court concluded that “a clerk in the office of the 
assistant treasurer of the United States, at Boston,” held a “continuing” 
position because “[h]is duties were continuing and permanent, not 
occasional or temporary.”168 
In United States v. Germaine, the Supreme Court followed Hartwell to 
conclude that a surgeon appointed by the “Commissioner of Pensions” to 
examine pensioners or pension claimants on an “on call” basis did not hold 
a “continuing” position because his “duties are not continuing and 
permanent, and they are occasional and intermittent.”169 The Supreme Court 
explained that “[t]he surgeon is only to act when called on by the 
Commissioner of Pensions in some special case . . . . He may make fifty of 
these examinations in a year, or none.”170 
Lastly, in Auffmordt v. Hedden, the Supreme Court followed both 
Hartwell and Germaine to conclude that a “merchant appraiser” hired by 
the Treasury Department for expert reappraisals of merchandise did not 
hold a continuing position because “[h]is position is without tenure, 
duration, continuing emolument, or continuous duties, and he acts only 
occasionally and temporarily.”171 The Supreme Court explained that “[h]e is 
an executive agent, as an expert assistant to aid in ascertaining the value of 
the goods, selected for the particular case on the request of the importer, 
and selected for his special knowledge in regard to the character and value 
of the particular goods in question.”172 The merchant appraiser “has no 
claim or right to be designated, or to act except as he may be designated.”173 
The doctrine of the “continuing” requirement has not changed 
significantly since 1890 when Auffmordt was decided. There are a few close 
cases, like that of independent counsel, where the position is held for an 
indefinite time period but concludes upon the completion of a discrete 
                                                                                                                           
 
168 Hartwell, 73 U.S. at 392–93. 
169 Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511–12. 
170 Id. at 512. 
171 Auffmordt, 137 U.S. at 326–27. 
172 Id. at 327. 
173 Id. 
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task.174 However, most cases fall neatly into the category of the clearly 
“continuing,” like the full-time, indefinitely employed special trial judges 
of the U.S. Tax Court, or the clearly temporary, like the special masters 
appointed by federal courts.175 In Tucker I, the IRS conceded that the full-
time, indefinitely employed positions of settlement officer, appeals officer, 
and appeals team manager are “continuing.”176 
 iii. Significant Authority 
A position must be vested with “significant authority” in order to 
constitute an Office.177 Quoting the keystone of Appointments Clause 
jurisprudence, Buckley v. Valeo, the courts have repeatedly held that “any 
appointee exercising significant authority . . . is an ‘Officer of the United 
States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed . . . .”178 It should also be noted 
that “Freytag calls on us to consider all the powers of the officials in 
question in evaluating whether their authority is ‘significant,’ not just those 
applied to the litigant bringing the challenge.”179 Stated otherwise, an 
Officer for one purpose is an Officer for all purposes. 
In Tucker I, the Tax Court echoed virtually all past courts and cases in 
saying “[t]he Supreme Court has yet to fully define the term ‘significant 
authority’; and ‘ascertaining the test’s real meaning requires a look at the 
roles of the employees whose status was at issue in other cases.’”180 In that 
                                                                                                                           
 
174 In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court weighed the fact that the position of “independent 
counsel” had “no time limit” against the fact that it “is appointed essentially to accomplish a single task, 
and when that task is over the office is terminated.” 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988). It ultimately concluded 
that “these factors relating to the ‘ideas of tenure, duration . . . and duties’ of the independent counsel,” 
Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511, “are sufficient to establish that appellant is an ‘inferior’ officer in the 
constitutional sense.” Id. 
175 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 (“[T]he duties, salary, and means of appointment for [special trial 
judges of the Tax Court] are specified by statute . . . . These characteristics distinguish special trial 
judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III courts on a temporary, episodic basis, whose 
positions are not established by law, and whose duties and functions are not delineated in a statute.”) 
176 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 160. 
177 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
178 Id. 
179 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882; Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1132). 
180 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 162 (quoting Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133). 
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vein, the Tax Court compared the IRS hearing officers to the special trial 
judges in Freytag, who were adjudicated to be Officers, and the ALJs in 
Landry v. FDIC, who were adjudicated to be mere employees. Ultimately, 
the Tax Court concluded that IRS hearing officers were more akin to ALJs 
than special trial judges because, like ALJs, they lacked final decision-
making authority.181 Moreover, IRS hearing officers also lack many of the 
“formal powers” granted to ALJs, such as “the authority to conduct ‘on the 
record’ hearings, to require attendance at those hearings, to administer oaths 
and affirmations, to issue subpoenas, to rule on offers of proof and receive 
evidence, and to order depositions.” Since the Tax Court found the 
reasoning of the Landry court persuasive in its determination that FDIC 
ALJs do not exercise significant authority, it likewise held that the “lesser 
position” of IRS hearing officer “does not exercise significant authority.”182 
This type of comparative reasoning was the standard modality for resolving 
Appointments Clause cases prior to Tucker II. 
2. Tucker II: Defining “Significant Authority” 
In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit did not disagree with the Tax Court on 
the facts of the case or its ultimate outcome. Like the Tax Court, it quickly 
dispensed with the argument that the settlement officers and appeals team 
manager who oversaw Mr. Tucker’s case abused their discretion in 
rejecting his OIC. It likewise held that IRS hearing officers are mere 
employees, not Officers.183 However, the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in 
reaching that conclusion demarks from the Tax Court’s in several important 
respects. 
First, the Tax Court held that none of the positions at issue were 
“established by Law” because none of them were created by statute or 
regulation.184 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit declined to reach the issue and 
implied in dicta that any lawful Office is “established by Law” irrespective 
                                                                                                                           
 
181 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 164. 
182 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 165. 
183 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1137. 
184 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 152–59. 
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of whether it is created by statute or regulation.185 Second, the Tax Court 
held that none of the positions at issue were vested with “significant 
authority” by analogizing to similar positions in other Appointments Clause 
cases.186 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit laid out a tripartite test to analyze 
those positions on their own merits without the need for comparison.187 
Specifically, the D.C. Circuit stated that “the main criteria for drawing 
the line between inferior Officers and employees not covered by the clause 
are (1) the significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2) the 
discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of 
those decisions.”188 No modern case law states that significant authority is 
possible without significance or discretion.189 However, some dicta from 
the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit suggest that final decision-making 
authority is not always necessary for a finding of significant authority.190 
In Freytag, the Supreme Court suggested that significant enough 
“duties and discretion” might outweigh the lack of authority to enter a final 
decision.191 However, the court went on to say that irrespective of that 
                                                                                                                           
 
185 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133 (“Nonetheless, it would seem anomalous if the Appointments Clause 
were inapplicable to positions extant in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and to which Congress assigned 
‘significant authority,’ merely because neither Congress nor the executive branch had formally created 
the positions.”). 
186 Tucker, 135 T.C. at 160–63 (“The Supreme Court has yet to fully define the term ‘significant 
authority’; and ‘ascertaining the test’s real meaning requires a look at the roles of the employees whose 
status was at issue in other cases.’”). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Although the OLC Memo concedes that “Buckley is sometimes read to hold that persons who 
[lack discretion] cannot themselves be considered officers” it nonetheless insists that “‘independent 
discretion’ is not a necessary attribute of delegated sovereign authority.” Officers of the U.S., 2007 OLC 
LEXIS 3* at *53–54. 
190 In addition to the cases that follow, Courts and commentators occasionally cite Edmonds for 
the proposition that “final decision-making authority” is not essential to “significant authority” or the 
definition of Officer, but rather, draws the line between inferior and principal Officers. Lindstedt, supra 
note 8, at 1178; see supra note 189. This interpretation of Edmonds misreads the precedent as well as 
the statutory authority of the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which was considered in that 
case. Those judges, in fact, do have final decision-making authority. In some instances, their decisions 
are subject to a right of appeal to a higher court within the executive branch, namely, the D.C. Circuit 
for the Armed Forces. However, a right of appeal can hardly be said to negate finality. 
191 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82. 
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possibility, its “conclusion would be unchanged” because special trial 
judges may issue final decisions for the Tax Court in declaratory judgment 
proceedings and limited-amount tax cases under section 7443A(b)(1), (2), 
and (3), as well as subsection (c).192 
In Landry v. FDIC, the D.C. Circuit also suggested that “purely 
recommendatory powers” were not “fatal in themselves.”193 However, in 
that same case, the court held that the lack of final decision-making 
authority was fatal to the claim that FDIC ALJs were Officers.194 In so 
holding, the court noted that the Supreme Court “laid exceptional stress on 
the [special trial judges’] final decisionmaking power” in Freytag and “that 
the [special trial judges’] power of final decision in certain classes of cases 
was critical to the Court’s decision.”195 
Tucker II states that “the cases are not altogether clear” and is silent on 
the question of whether each of these “main criteria” are necessary to find 
“significant authority.”196 However, an analysis of modern case law reveals 
that whenever a court holds that one of the three “main criteria” is absent, it 
also holds that “significant authority” is absent. For example, in Landry v. 
FDIC, the D.C. Circuit found that FDIC ALJs had (1) “significant” power 
and (2) “discretion,” but (3) no “final decision-making authority” because 
each and every one of their cases was reviewed de novo by the FDIC 
Board.197 As a result, the Court held that FDIC ALJs are mere employees.198 
In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit found that the IRS hearing officers had 
(1) “significant” power and (2) “final decision-making authority,” but 
(3) no “discretion.”199 As a result, the Court held that IRS hearing officers 
                                                                                                                           
 
192 Id. 
193 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134. 
194 Id.; see also Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134 (“In Landry . . . we found the absence of any authority 
to render final decisions fatal to the claim that the administrative law judges at issue there were Officers 
rather than employees.”). 
195 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134. 
196 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133. 
197 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1132–34. 
198 Id. 
199 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1132–35. 
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are mere employees.200 Only in cases like Freytag, where the Supreme 
Court found all three criteria for significant authority, are the positions at 
issue held to be Offices. Although the courts occasionally indicate that final 
decision-making authority is unnecessary, none of them have actually found 
significant authority absent the power to make final decisions.201 Given that 
fact, this Article submits that each of the three “main criteria” is a necessary 
element of significant authority in all or most cases. 
a. Significant or Important Power 
One of the three “main criteria” for “significant authority” is power 
over significant matters.202 A matter is significant if it is “substantively 
significant,” meaning that it is important, real, or meaningful in nature.203 
Although Tucker II was light on reasoning in this respect, the 
requirement of “significance” appears to derive directly from the term 
“significant authority” and Buckley v. Valeo. If a position must be imbued 
with “significant authority” to constitute an Office, then it logically follows 
that a position vested only with insignificant authority cannot constitute an 
Office. Beyond logic, pragmatism requires significance. It would be a waste 
of time and resources to subject the selection of truly insignificant posts to 
the rigors of the Appointments Clause. For example, every year, the U.S. 
House of Representatives co-sponsors “a nationwide high school visual art 
competition” with the Congressional Institute.204 “Students submit entries to 
their representative’s office, and panels of district artists select the winning 
entries . . . . The winning works are displayed for one year at the U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
 
200 Id. 
201 This Article concedes that “significant authority” without final decision-making authority is 
theoretically possible given the dicta in Freytag and other cases. However, the axiom, “actions speak 
louder than words” comes to mind. A legal framework’s usefulness hinges on its ability to explain past 
decisions and predict future outcomes, and in every case to date, a lack of final decision-making 
authority has been determinative. 
202 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133. 
203 See id. Black’s Law Dictionary equates “[i]mportance” with “significance.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 824 (9th ed. 2009). 
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Capitol.”205 Even making the unrealistic assumption that these “district 
artists” meet the other requirements of the Appointments Clause, it would 
be absurd to hold that they are Officers. The subject matter of judging a 
high school art competition is simply not significant or important enough to 
justify appointment by the President, Courts of Law, or Heads of 
Departments. 
In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit assumed “that the issue of a person’s tax 
liability is substantively significant” given the Supreme Court’s previous 
decision in Freytag that special trial judges’ power over tax liability 
constitutes “significant authority.”206 
b. Discretion 
One of the three “main criteria” for “significant authority” is 
“discretion.”207 A position is vested with discretion when the tasks of its 
holder are “more than ministerial.”208 Stated in the opposite, a position 
lacks discretion if its tasks “allowed the holder no choice . . . even though 
the consequences of his ministerial decisions were both vital and final.”209 
For example, a federal executioner has no discretion. The executioner has 
power over significant matters—quite literally, life and death. The 
executioner has final decision-making authority—there is no appeal after 
she pulls the switch.210 However, the executioner has no discretion. The 
justice system tells her to execute or not, and thus, she lacks “significant 
authority” and is not an Officer. 
The requirement of discretion derives from Freytag,211 and ultimately, 
Buckley v. Valeo.212 For this proposition, Tucker II cites directly to the 
                                                                                                                           
 
205 Id. 
206 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 1134 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881). 
209 Id. at 1134. 
210 “Dead men tell no tales,” nor do they file appeals. 
211 See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82. 
212 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140. 
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Supreme Court and states “in Freytag the Court was at pains to note that the 
STJs’ tasks were ‘more than ministerial.’”213 Moreover, in Freytag, the 
Supreme Court explicitly held that “special trial judges exercise significant 
discretion” in finding them Officers.214 Thus, neither the concept, nor the 
term of discretion was invented by the D.C. Circuit in Tucker II.215 Instead, 
it drew the term and its meaning in the context of the Appointments Clause 
directly from Freytag.216 Both “discretion” and “final decision-making 
authority” are aspects of “independent authority” in Freytag, and 
ultimately, the power to act “free from day-to-day supervision” in Buckley 
v. Valeo.217 
In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit held that IRS hearing officers lacked 
discretion, and hence, lacked significant authority.218 It reached that 
conclusion because that position is “subject to consultation requirements, to 
guidelines, and to supervision” with respect to all decisions.219 To 
summarize the court’s reasoning, any issues that come before an IRS 
hearing officer are resolved without her discretion by reference to the 
Internal Revenue Manual, published IRS guidance, Treasury regulations, or 
directions from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel and other higher-ups in the 
Treasury Department.220 Like the executioner, the IRS hearing officer has 
                                                                                                                           
 
213 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881). 
214 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882. In fact, the D.C. Circuit previously recognized the importance of 
Freytag’s reference to “significant discretion” in Landry v. FDIC and labeled it “a magic phrase under 
the Buckley test.” Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134. 
215 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134; Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82. 
216 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134. 
217 See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140. 
218 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134. 
219 Id. 
220  
[I]n reaching such decisions (and indeed in all its decisions), Appeals is subject to 
consultation requirements, to guidelines, and to supervision. First, the office is instructed 
in the Internal Revenue Manual to ‘[r]equest legal advice from an Associate Chief Counsel 
office on novel or significant issues.’ I.R.M. pt. 8.6.3.5 (Oct. 26, 2007). Second, the 
Manual tells Appeals to seek a ‘Technical Advice Memorandum’ from the Chief 
Counsel’s Office ‘when a lack of uniformity exists on the disposition of the issue or the 
issue is unusual or complex enough to warrant consideration by the Office of Chief 
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no discretion to settle a tax case or not, she simply follows the manual or 
her superior’s instructions.221 
c. Final Decision-Making Authority 
One of the three “main criteria” for “significant authority” is final 
decision-making authority.222 There are at least three plausible schools of 
thought on what constitutes “final decision-making authority.” First, one 
might argue that the case law is simply too vague to define a final decision, 
and perhaps the term has different meanings in different contexts.223 
Second, Professor Lindsedt cites to the administrative definition of finality 
and argues that a final decision is better defined as “an action which is 
necessary and sufficient for judicial review.”224 Third, this Article concurs 
                                                                                                                           
 
(The Chief Counsel is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. 26 U.S.C. § 7803(b)(1).). Third, Appeals is required to follow any established 
technical or legal IRS position that is favorable to the taxpayer. I.R.M. pt. 8.6.3.5.2; 26 
C.F.R. § 601.106(f)(9)(viii)(c). Fourth, various regulations and the Internal Revenue 
Manual impose detailed guidelines for what settlements Appeals may accept. See, e.g., 26 
C.F.R. § 601.106(f); I.R.M. pt. 8.23.1; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7122(d)(1) (requiring the 
Secretary to prescribe such guidelines). Fifth, Appeals must obtain a favorable opinion 
from the General Counsel for the Treasury for any compromise in which the unpaid 
amount of tax is $50,000 or more, and its compromises of smaller amounts are subject to 
‘continuing quality review by the Secretary.’ I.R.C. § 7122(b). The authority to provide a 
favorable opinion for compromises of $50,000 or more has been delegated to the Chief 
Counsel and redelegated to Division Counsel, see I.R.M. pt. 33.3.2.1(3) (Nov. 4, 2010), 
but such delegations could be revoked at the General Counsel’s discretion. Sixth, any 
‘closing agreement’ relieving a taxpayer of liability must be approved by the Secretary. 
I.R.C. § 7121(b). As with the General Counsel approval, that authority has been delegated 
to the Commissioner, 26 C.F.R. § 601.202(a)(1), and redelegated to others including some 
Appeals employees, see Delegation Order 8-3, I.R.M. pt. 1.2.47.4 (Aug. 18, 1997) 
(formerly Delegation Order No. 97 (Rev. 34)); I.R.M. pt. 8.13.1.1.6 (Nov. 9, 2007), but the 
Secretary remains free to revoke it if he finds defects in practice under the delegations. 
Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134–35. 
221 Supra note 220. 
222 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
223 For example, what constitutes a final decision for an executive agency might differ from what 
constitutes a final decision for a court. 
224 Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1178. 
  
2 3 6  | P i t t s b u r g h  T a x  R e v i e w  |  V o l .  1 1  2 0 1 4  
 
Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)  
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2014.26 | http://taxreview.law.pitt.edu 
with Tucker I that a final decision is the “last word” within the agency or 
court in question.225 
A position is vested with final decision-making authority when its 
holder “has the final say within the agency” or court.226 In case after case, 
the courts have analyzed finality under the Appointments Clause in terms of 
the last word for the agency or court. In Freytag, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that special trial judges possess “final decision-making authority” 
because they are authorized to make the “final decision of the Tax Court” in 
declaratory judgment proceedings and limited-amount tax cases.227 In 
Landry v. FDIC, the D.C. Circuit held that ALJs lack final decision-making 
authority because each and every one of their cases is subject to de novo 
review by the FDIC Board, and thus, they “can never render the decision of 
the FDIC.”228 In Tucker I, the Tax Court held that IRS hearing officers lack 
final decision-making authority because they lack “the power to make final 
decisions for the IRS.”229 In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit reversed the Tax 
Court to hold that IRS hearing officers possess final decision-making 
authority because they have the power to make final “decisions within the 
executive branch.”230 
In one very strong sense, equating finality with actions that trigger 
judicial review is attractive. That standard draws a bright line. If the 
decision is appealable to court, then it is final. However, outside of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
225 See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 162–65. 
226 Id. (framing the issue in Tucker I as whether the positions at issue “possess the power to make 
final decisions for the IRS”). 
227 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 877–82. 
228 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133–34. 
229 See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 162–65. In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit held the opposite. Tucker, 676 
F.3d at 1134. IRS hearing officers have final decision-making authority because they have the power to 
make final “decisions within the executive branch.” Id. 
230 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134. If anything, the D.C. Circuit stated a higher standard for finality 
than the Tax Court by defining finality with respect to the entire executive branch rather than one 
agency. Id. However, it is doubtful that the D.C. Circuit meant to propound a new rule that finality 
requires finality within an entire branch of government. See id. In that extreme case, one could argue 
that only Supreme Court decisions are final within the judicial branch. See id. However, the court 
offered no explanation for its conclusion that IRS hearing officers possess final decision-making 
authority so one is largely left to guess at its reasoning. Id. 
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administrative law context, this type of standard may not apply at all.231 
Judges of the Tax Court issue decisions in so-called S cases which “shall 
not be reviewed in any court . . . .”232 The fact that S cases are not subject to 
appeal does not make them any less final. In fact, the Supreme Court held 
that the power to decide S cases evidenced final decision-making authority, 
and in effect, ensured that special trial judges are Officers.233 
Equating finality in terms of finality within an agency or court has the 
disadvantage of being harder to determine. On occasion, it may be difficult 
to identify the “agency” in question. For example, in the case of IRS 
hearing officers, is the Office of Appeals the agency in question, or the 
entire IRS? 
However, from Freytag to Tucker I, the courts have defined finality in 
terms of finality for the agency or court. It is also a metric that can 
theoretically apply to any case, not just those in the administrative context. 
Therefore, this Article concludes that a position is vested with final 
decision-making authority when its holder “has the final say within the 
agency” or court.234 
B. Status Quo Bias and the Appointments Clause 
Status quo bias is defined as a cognitive bias for the status quo.235 It 
refers to our innate, human preference for things to stay the same, even 
when change is positive.236 Of course, not all change is a good thing. A 
                                                                                                                           
 
231 In fact, Professor Lindstedt admits that “finality may look different to an agency than it does to 
a court.” Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1175. 
232 The amount in controversy in cases decided under section 7463(b) may not exceed $50,000, so 
they are often referred to as S cases or small tax cases. See I.R.C. § 7463(a), (b). 
233 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 879. 
234 See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 162–65 (framing the issue in Tucker I as whether the positions at issue 
“possess the power to make final decisions for the IRS”). 
235 William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhuaser are credited with coining the term “status quo 
bias” in 1988. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). See also DEBORAH A. GEIER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 119 (1st ed. 2014) (“under the status quo cognitive bias, 
we like things to stay relatively the same, or, stated differently, we are resistant to change”). 
236 Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 235. 
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court may, quite rationally, be reluctant to upset centuries of practice or 
throw entire government agencies into chaos.237 Rational or otherwise, there 
is a heavy preference for the status quo in Appointments Clause cases, 
including the Tucker decisions. Findings of violations are few and far 
between. Although the Tax Court and D.C. Circuit disagreed on why, both 
of the Tucker decisions held that IRS hearing officers are mere employees 
and found no constitutional problem.238 Moreover, where violations are 
found, they are typically attributable to recent laws. In Buckley v. Valeo, the 
Supreme Court struck down a statute passed only a few years earlier and 
returned election law to the status quo.239 In the case of the infamous 
“Duffy Defect,” Congress amended a law that was only in place for a little 
over eight years and returned the power to appoint administrative patent 
judges to the Secretary of Commerce, who held that power before the 
offending law was passed. Whether a violation is found or not, 
Appointments Clause cases tend to reinforce the status quo. 
The Tucker decisions provide an objective legal framework to evaluate 
Appointments Clause cases. However, that framework is the construct of 
many moving parts and definitions, each of which is subject to some level 
of interpretation. The precise definitions of significance, discretion, and 
final decision-making authority are still debatable. In close cases, there is 
ample room for subjective or qualitative biases to play a role. To 
successfully predict outcomes, one must be cognizant of the thumb on the 
scale for the status quo. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the first time, the federal courts have outlined a comprehensive 
legal framework to define “Officers of the United States” under the 
Appointments Clause. Under Tucker I, an Officer holds a position that is 
(1) “established by Law,” (2) “continuing,” and (3) vested with “significant 
                                                                                                                           
 
237 In all likelihood, the pragmatic concern for efficient and effective government operations is the 
main driver for preferring the status quo in Appointments Clause cases. Patently ridiculous or extremely 
inconvenient legal outcomes are often ignored using the old rationale that “[t]he Constitution is not a 
suicide pact.” 
238 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1135; Tucker, 135 T.C. at 165–66. 
239 See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1. 
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authority.” Under Tucker II, “significant authority” consists of three “main 
criteria”: (1) power over “significant” or important matters, 
(2) “discretion,” and (3) “final” decision-making authority. This Article 
adds the observation that each of the three criteria is a necessary element of 
significant authority in all or most cases. 
The Tucker tests provide an objective paradigm for deciding and 
predicting the outcome of Appointments Clause cases. However, that 
paradigm has a lot of moving parts, each of which is subject to 
interpretation. In close cases, where more than one interpretation is 
possible, it is critical to understand that courts have a heavy preference for 
the status quo. Perhaps that preference is due to status quo bias or a rational 
desire to avoid upsetting the federal applecart. Either way, litigants and 
commentators repeatedly admonish the courts to apply the Appointments 
Clause more vigorously. In particular, the Tucker decisions are criticized 
for threatening the political accountability of positions in the IRS, and 
ultimately, the separation of powers.240 
However, courts should be very wary of overusing the Appointments 
Clause. If every single ALJ, low-level IRS bureaucrat, and countless 
equivalent positions in the federal government are held to constitute Offices 
which require appointment, the end result is all too predictable. The 
President, Courts of Law, and Heads of Departments will happily fire up 
their autopens and appoint every single position in the federal government. 
In the case of low-level positions, nothing is gained. Regardless of their 
status under the Appointments Clause, the Secretary of the Treasury will 
never personally interview IRS hearing officers. Each one will receive a 
certificate of appointment suitable for framing, but otherwise, their 
selection process remains the same. This charade would be useless, but not 
without cost. Higher-level positions, like special trial judge, independent 
counsel, or assistant attorney general, are liable to be lost in the shuffle of 
thousands or even millions of meaningless appointments. Ironically enough, 
overzealous application of the Appointments Clause is just as dangerous as 
                                                                                                                           
 
240 Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 1187–89. 
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ignoring it altogether. Appointing everyone is tantamount to appointing no 
one.241 
                                                                                                                           
 
241 Tens of thousands of nominations for military office are sent to the Senate each year, and they 
receive little or no scrutiny. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 191 n.6 (“Senate confirmation of 
military and naval officers has become for all practical purposes an empty formality”) (quoting JOSEPH 
P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 331 (1953)). See also Lindstedt, supra note 8, at 
1186–87 (“our government has faced the annual appointment of roughly 240,000 military officers in the 
past”). 
